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Is the party-appointed arbitrator a “pernicious institution”?  




Some readers of the Columbia FDI Perspective No 33 of December 14, 2010 may have 
been surprised to read Hans Smit’s contribution against party-appointed arbitrators. The opening 
of his Perspective could not be expressed in more sweeping terms: “In my judgment, party-
appointed arbitrators should be banned unless their role as advocates for the party that appointed 
them is fully disclosed and accepted. Until this is done, arbitration can never meet its aspiration 
of providing dispassionate adjudication...” 
 
Criticisms of the appointment of arbitrators by parties are not novel, but it is surprising to 
see them raised by such a highly regarded and senior member of the international arbitral 
community as Professor Smit. I consider his views too negative: appropriate safeguards exist to 
take care of his concerns. He considers that, while in international commercial arbitration party-
appointed arbitrators are expected to be objective and impartial (and not become advocates of the 
parties appointing them, as he claims is the reality in the U.S.), party-appointed arbitrators 
“respond to their personal incentives and become to a certain extent party advocates.” I do not 
believe that the responsible, reputable lawyers available for such appointments are amenable to 
these temptations, especially considering the control that arbitral institutions exercise. 
 
The first argument for retaining the current system is based on the very nature of 
arbitration that distinguishes this process from adjudication by permanent courts endowed with 
ex-ante jurisdiction on litigants.  
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 By contrast, arbitration remits to the parties the choice of adjudicators. Internationally, 
this approach is even more attractive. Arbitration allows the parties to agree on such basic issues 
as applicable laws and jurisdiction, language and seat of the arbitration, avoiding hurdles that 
hamper the judicial solution of a transnational dispute and its enforcement. The ability to select 
arbitrators is prominent among the elements favoring arbitration as it reflects the expectations of 
the appointing party regarding nationality, language, cultural background, and legal and technical 
expertise. Acceptance of the ultimate result (the award) by the parties is enhanced by their trust 
in the arbitral process where consent – including consent regarding the adjudicator – replaces 
judicial authority. Various precautionary devices have been introduced, mostly through practice, 
to ensure that these advantages are not undermined by the parties’ abuse of power. 
 
The first such device is the general recognition that arbitrators are not agents of the 
parties appointing them but rather trustees who have to decide the dispute fairly, according to 
applicable substantive and procedural rules reflecting the common intention of the parties to 
resort to arbitration. 
 
Secondly, the rules of arbitral institutions often provide for a monitoring of the selection 
of arbitrators by the parties. Local courts, or foreign courts under the New York Convention of 
1958 where recognition is sought, are empowered to control whether basic rules of due process 
have been respected. 
 
Thirdly, arbitration rules require that arbitrators be impartial and independent in general, 
including as regards party-appointed arbitrators toward the parties appointing them. Arbitration 
rules also require that arbitrators disclose situations giving rise to potential conflicts of interest. 
The IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration of 2004 are intended to 
enhance standards as part of the development of uniform best practices. Their first General 
Principle states that “[e]very international arbitrator shall be impartial and independent of the 
parties at the time of accepting an appointment and shall remain so until the final award has been 
rendered.” 
 
Prof. Smit fears nonetheless that the lack of impartiality of a party-appointed arbitrator 
may unduly influence outcomes. Thus, in order to reach a unanimous award, a tribunal might 
incline toward the argument put forward by one of the parties without proper justification. 
Empirical evidence from the rejection of most disqualification requests confirms that the great 
majority of arbitrators are serious professionals who take care and pride in being independent 
and impartial. If a party-appointed arbitrator is biased he or she will end up in the minority. On 
the other hand, there is nothing wrong if such an arbitrator shares in good faith the position of the 
party who has made the appointment.  
 
Finally, one has to consider the alternatives to the appointment of arbitrators by the 
parties. Who would systematically make all appointments? In ad hoc arbitration, the issue would 
have no easy solution. In administered arbitration, the task entrusted to the institution in charge 
of the process would be challenging. Lists would have to be kept, transparency requirements for 
the choices would become paramount and other types of influences and pressures might derail 
the fairness of the process. More decisively, international commercial arbitration would lose one 
  
of its fundamental features, becoming a kind of international quasi-judicial mechanism. Such a 
system could not be compelled on parties that could migrate to institutions more deferent to their 
choices. 
 
As to investment arbitration, Prof. Smit’s argument that arbitral decisions that can affect 
the State and its people “should not be rendered by privately selected arbitrators but by 
arbitrators selected by truly neutral institutions” carries more weight. In selecting an arbitrator in 
such disputes, parties may wish to look more closely at the general profiles of candidates and at 
their positions on relevant issues. To avoid a “conflation of personal and professional incentives” 
in investment arbitration that institutions can detect, it has been suggested that advocates be 
barred from acting as arbitrators. 
 
So, on balance, let’s not throw the baby out with the bath water! 
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